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I. INTRODUCTION
Many people feel called to law practice because they sense that law can
be an avenue for helping others and improving society. But what should the
lawyer of faith hope for, and expect from, law? The question might sound
overly abstract or general. This Essay will explain why the question matters,
not just as a matter of theory, but also to the real-world lawyering journeys
taken by people of faith. This Essay develops three points: (1) there are
different answers to this question; (2) the answers matter not just to
theologians but to lawyers of faith because our answers can shape our
expectations about law practice and how we see our purpose in practicing
law; and (3) although our answers to this question do indeed matter, the
answers will not be enough to explain and sustain our lawyering journeys.
Thus, this last point will include a discussion of what else we will need as
* Homer R. Mitchell Endowed Professor of Law and Associate Provost, SMU. This essay is a
version of the 2008 Louis Brandeis Lecture given at Pepperdine Law School. I thank Professor
Robert Cochran for his comments and encouragement, and for arranging the panel of commentators.
And I am grateful to the excellent scholars who commented on the talk: Professor Dallas Willard,
Professor Douglas W. Kmiec, and Professor Edward Larson. It was a privilege to receive comments
from these three Professors, especially because I have long admired their writings.
This article began with talks with my friend Reverend Frank Yates, now Pastor of St.
Andrews Presbyterian Church in Albuquerque, New Mexico. I thank him for his invaluable and
insightful guidance on this and other topics. I am also grateful for the input of Lee Taft and Will
Pryor. Please send comments to epryor@smu.edu.
we try to cooperate in God's justice through our imperfect practice of
imperfect human law.
What should a lawyer of faith hope for, and expect from, law? Early in
my law practice, a particular case raised this question in a way that was a
shock to my system. Thus, this introduction describes the path that led me
to this case, and then the case itself.
Following law school, I clerked for the Honorable Carl McGowan of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. One of the cases
that came before the court was a widow's claim for death benefits under the
Black Lung Act.1 Her husband had died of black lung disease after a
lifetime of working in the coal mines of West Virginia. An administrative
law judge had denied her claim on the basis of insufficient proof that her
husband had worked enough time in the mines. The three-judge panel
reversed the judge's denial and granted the widow her benefits.
The woman's lawyer specialized in black lung cases; his office was
somewhere in West Virginia. I recall thinking that the woman's case-
though strong-might not have made it to or won in the court of appeals if
she had not had a good lawyer. This fundamentally altered my plans about
the kind of law practice I wanted to find at the end of my clerkship.
Although this sounds very simplistic now, I decided then that I wanted to be
a lawyer who worked on claims that might not be "big" cases, but whose
outcome was crucial for individual clients and for which the presence of a
lawyer would make a difference.
So I changed my plans-which had been to work as an associate in a
D.C. or Dallas firm-and began to search in my hometown of Dallas for a
firm that engaged in direct people practice. I sent letters to family, criminal,
personal injury, and the few employment/civil rights firms I could find. Ijoined a twelve-man firm engaged primarily in a plaintiffs personal injury
practice. The firm's practice included tort claims and workers'
compensation (which at that time in Texas could result in a de novo jury
trial); in addition, the firm sometimes handled probate and family law
matters. I worked in all these areas, and I was also able to handle pro bono
social security claims, federal workers' compensation claims, and occasional
civil service disability claims. All of the work was engrossing, but the case
that became the most captivating and time-consuming was a disability-
related civil rights case based primarily on section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.
1. See generally 30 U.S.C. § 901 (2006).
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II. DONALD R. BALABAN V. COUNTY OF DALLAS
Passed in 1973, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibited
discrimination against "otherwise qualified handicapped individuals" in
federal agencies or in programs or activities receiving federal assistance.
2
Later, in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Congress
would extend the disability-related antidiscrimination mandate beyond those
entities covered by section 504 (federal agencies and recipients of federal
assistance) to private employers, public services, and public
accommodations and services operated by private entities.3 The ADA (and,
since 1992, section 5044) use the term "individual with a disability" rather
2. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). As Professor Bagenstos has noted in one of his many scholarly
explorations of disability law: "The 1973 enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare's promulgation in 1977 of regulations to implement the
antidiscrimination requirements of Section 504 of that Act, constituted the first significant federal
initiative to guarantee civil rights to people with disabilities." Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans
with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 921, 958 (2003). The Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) expanded the scope of disability-related discrimination protection
beyond federal agencies and programs/activities receiving federal funds to private employers, public
services, and public accommodations and services operated by private entities. See 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213 (2008). The ADA does not use the term "otherwise qualified handicapped
individual"; rather, the operative phrase is "qualified individual with a disability." See id. §
12112(a) (referring to employment); § 12131(2) (referring to public services); § 12102(2) (defining
"disability").
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2008). As has been often noted, the ADA's definition of a
disability, and a qualified person with a disability, drew heavily on the Rehabilitation Act's
definition of a handicapped individual. "Congress drew the ADA's definition of disability almost
verbatim from the definition of 'handicapped individual' in the Rehabilitation Act .... " Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193 (2002). However, the ADA did not supplant
section 504. The case law includes litigation alleging violations of section 504 only, the ADA only,
and both. See, e.g., Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (regarding a claim based on
section 504-Plaintiff was a candidate for the U.S. Foreign Service whose medical clearance was
revoked when the State Department learned that she had stage-one breast cancer). As Professor
Rothstein has explained:
Section 504 is very sparse in its statutory language. The details of what is required were
spelled out initially in regulations and subsequently in case law development. The ADA
statutory language draws on this body of administrative and judicial interpretation and
incorporates much of it directly into the statutory language itself. There are, however,
additional detailed regulations and substantial administrative agency guidelines on how
the ADA should be interpreted. It is clear that the two statutes are intended to be
interpreted consistently in most instances.
Laura F. Rothstein, Higher Education and the Future of Disability Policy, 52 ALA. L. REv. 241, 246
(2000) (footnotes omitted). For further discussion of the overlaps and differences between the two
laws, see Katie Eyer, Note, Rehabilitation Act Redux, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 271 (2005).
4. The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992, and among the changes was the use of
disability rather than handicapped person. Pub. L. No. 102-569, § 102(p)(3 2 ), 106 Stat. 4344
(1992).
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than "handicapped individual," a change both reflecting and reinforcing the
terminology preferred by the disability-rights community by the time of the
ADA's passage. 5
The firm filed the case in federal court in December 1982,6 a few
months after I started at the firm. To describe the case, I will draw on the
pleadings, findings, and orders in the case. The plaintiff, our client, was
Donald R. Balaban, M.D., a urologist and surgeon who was diagnosed with
multiple sclerosis 7 in the mid-1970s. Sometime after his diagnosis, he
closed down his private practice and, in May 1977, obtained a job at the
Dallas County Health Department (DCHD) to serve as a part-time Assistant
Director of the DCHD.8
By the time our firm began representing him in 1982, his condition had
deteriorated significantly; he was essentially bedridden and unable to work.
The extent of his disability during times relevant to his lawsuit was disputed
to varying degrees. Before he was hired at DCHD, the Acting Director
contacted the Texas Department of Health and expressed reservations about
Dr. Balaban's handicap. 9 The Acting Director believed that Dr. Balaban
was very knowledgeable but "markedly impaired." 10
According to the plaintiffs allegations," when he first started at
DCHD, his role was essentially to serve as a consultative physician,
requiring telephone contact and paperwork (including immunization records,
rather than direct patient care). For his first two years, he received above
average annual performance ratings from the Acting Director of DCHD. At
5. "In the years since the passage of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, disability rights advocates'
own language had changed, and in the late 1980s the terminology changed. 'Handicapped' had been
replaced by 'disabled' at advocates' insistence." See Mary Johnson, Before Its Time: Public
Perception of Disability Rights, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Future of Access and
Accommodation, 23 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 121, 137 (2007) (footnote omitted).
6. Balaban v. County of Dallas, Texas, No. CA 3-82-2169-G (N.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 1982) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Original Complaint].
7. This is a "chronic neurological disorder that affects the central nervous system." Sarah
Ringold, Cassio Lynm & Richard M. Glass, Multiple Sclerosis, 296 J.A.M.A. 2880 (Dec. 20, 2006),
available at http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/fuIll296/23/2880. The disease inflames and
damages the insulation around nerve fibers (known as myelin), thus resulting in impaired nerve
signaling. Id. For a detailed overview of the disease, current treatments, and future research, see
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, BOARD ON NEUROSCIENCE AND BEHAVIORAL HEALTH,
MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS: CURRENT STATUS AND STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE (Janet E. Joy &
Richard B. Johnston, Jr. eds. 2001) [hereinafter NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES].
8. Original Complaint, supra note 6, at 4.
9. Letter from Taylor D. August, Dir., Office for Civil Rights, Dep't of Health, Educ., &Welfare, to Elliot Salenger, M.D., Dir., Dallas County Health Dep't, at 2 (Oct. 24, 1977) (on file
with author) [hereinafter First OCR Findings]. This letter was admitted into evidence for trial.
10. Id.
11. Pretrial Order at 2, Balaban v. County of Dallas, Texas, No. CA 3-82-2169-G (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 4, 1985) (on file with author) [hereinafter Pretrial Order]. This paragraph is from the
"Plaintiff's Claims" portion of the Pretrial Order, not the stipulated facts portion.
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the time, he had some difficulty with walking and manual dexterity, but
otherwise was able to perform the job duties.
In the summer of 1979, a new Acting Director took over 12 and, within
days, fired Dr. Balaban. 13 Dr. Balaban filed a complaint with the Office of
Civil Rights (OCR). 14  The OCR investigated and concluded, in October
1979, that Dr. Balaban's termination had been discriminatory.15 The OCR
concluded that many of the criticisms of Dr. Balaban's performance were
"direct manifestations of Dr. Balaban's handicapping condition and in no
way affected his ability to perform his job."'16 In addition, the OCR found
no effort "on the part of the department to make reasonable accommodation
for Dr. Balaban's handicap."' 17 The OCR ordered that he be reinstated and
that the DCHD provide "Dr. Balaban with an office that is accessible to
restroom facilities to comply with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act."18
When the findings of the OCR were sent to DCHD, a new Director-
Dr. Salenger-had been hired. 19 Dr. Salenger sent a letter to OCR stating
that Dr. Balaban had been reinstated and would be provided with an office
accessible to restroom facilities. 20 Yet problems between DCHD (including
Dr. Salenger) and Dr. Balaban persisted for the next six months. 2' He was
fired again in June 1980.22 Dr. Balaban filed another complaint with OCR,
and also an appeal of the firing to the Texas Merit System Council.
23
According to the findings of the OCR 24 and the Texas Merit System
Council, 25 the following are some of the developments, that occurred
12. First OCR Findings, supra note 9, at 4.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 3. The OCR findings included a list of the criticisms that Dr. Balaban's co-employees
and supervisors voiced. Id. at 2-3. Some related to his falling in the halls (he was using a walker at
the time), the times when he could not control his bladder in time to make it to the available
restroom, and refusing offers of assistance when he fell. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at4.
19. Pretrial Order, supra note 11, at 3.
20. Letter from Elliot Salenger, M.D., Dir., Dallas County Health Dep't to Taylor D. August,
Dir., Office for Civil Rights, Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare (Nov. 15, 1979) (on file with
author). This letter was admitted into evidence for trial. After some back-and-forth visits and
correspondence between DCHD and OCR, the OCR notified DCHD that it was now closing the
investigation on the first complaint. Id.
21. Pretrial Order, supra note I1, at 3.
22. Id.
23. Original Complaint, supra note 6, at 7.
24. Letter from David A. Coronado, Reg'l Dir., Office for Civil Rights, Dep't of Health, Educ.,
between the time of Dr. Balaban's reinstatement (November 1979) and his
second firing in June 1980.
Dr. Balaban was not reinstated to the actual position he had held at the
time he was first fired.26 Rather, in November 1979, he was placed at one of
the jail facilities, and had clinical duties there. (This jail was known as the
"Old County Jail.") The staff of the OCR toured the Old County Jail soon
after Dr. Balaban's reassignment there and "found the facility inaccessible to
mobility-impaired persons.
The new position was "distinctly different and unrelated" to the
demands of his first position.28 In addition, the new location posed "several
working conditions more adverse than those of his former position,"'2 9
including a carrel-type desk "where he experienced mobility problems with
his walker and wheelchair due to a heavy door and other architectural
barriers."3 °
When Dr. Balaban was at the Old County Jail facility, he was required
to remain locked outside the nursing station any time when the nurses were
away from the area.31 This reduced his ability to perform clinical duties and
also made it hard for him to reach an accessible restroom facility.32 After
the OCR discussed this practice with DCHD, the policy was changed, and
Dr. Balaban was allowed access to the nursing station at all times.33
In April 1980, Dr. Balaban was required to sign in and out each day, and
no other employee was required to do so.34  Disputes continued over
& Welfare, to Elliot Salenger, M.D., Dir., Dallas County Health Dep't (July 15, 1981) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Second OCR Findings]. This letter was admitted into evidence for trial.
25. Council Decision, Balaban v. Dallas County Health Dep't, No. 1380 (Tex. Merit Sys.
Council Aug. 8, 1980) (on file with author) [hereinafter Council Decision].
26. Second OCR Findings, supra note 24, at 2.
27. Id.
28. Council Decision, supra note 25, at 6.
29. Id. at 7.
30. Id. at 8. This decision was introduced into evidence at the trial. The Council Decision
ordered that Dr. Balaban be reinstated "to a position, which is non-discriminatory with regard to
physical handicap, in the class of Public Health Physician I..." Id. at 15. Interestingly, the Council
made the following finding on one issue: "Appellant [Dr. Balaban] failed to sustain his burden of
proof that his dismissal was in whole or in part because of his physical handicap." Id. at 14. Yet, in
response to the next issue, the Council's next finding was: "We cannot say with certitude that
Appellant's dismissal was in reprisal or retaliation" for the OCR complaints. Id. "However, all the
uncontroverted evidence, from Dr. Salenger's misleading November 15, 1979 letter to HEW(Finding 1) through the unnecessarily cruel ejection of Appellant from his duty area upon dismissal
(Finding 22), leads to an inescapable conclusion that Appellant was subjected to a continuing course
of intimidation and harassment." Id.
31. Id. at 8.
32. Id.
33. Second OCR Findings, supra note 24, at 2.
34. Id. at 4.
552
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whether Dr. Balaban ever slept on the job3 5 or had received permission to
leave work for scheduled weekly blood work.36 Dr. Balaban received
warnings from the Director about various times when, according to the
Director, Dr. Balaban had violated time policies. 37  But, according to the
OCR findings, "Dr. Balaban was subject to a different method of supervision
from that of other employees[,] which contributed to what [DCHD]
consider[ed] his failure to comply with established procedures. 38
Four hours after he reported to work on June 5, 1980, Dr. Balaban was
verbally informed that he was terminated, effective immediately. 39 He was
instructed to vacate the jail premises, escorted from the jail by Sheriffs
deputies, and transported home in a prisoner transit vehicle. 40 He then
received notice of the termination by letter dated June 4; the letter stated that
he was terminated immediately given "frequency of abandonment of [his]
position, lack of reporting [his] tardiness and early departures to [his]
supervisors, sleeping on duty, and inappropriateness of [his] medical
decisions. 4 1
The OCR concluded that "the Dallas County Health Department [had]
subjected Dr. Balaban to a pattern of retaliation and harassment. 4  The
OCR ordered several actions, including reasonable accommodations, an
"appropriate chair and desk, a telephone, and any other basic office
equipment necessary to the performance of his duties," and clarification of
his duties and supervisors.4 3
The DCHD responded to the OCR with a letter strongly disagreeing
with the findings and the necessity of the remedial steps. The DCHD
believed that the OCR had not "fully investigated Dr. Balaban's actions or
activities with respect to his ability to provide medical care and his
responsiveness to report on time, and his inappropriate excuses for leaving
his position uncovered repeatedly within Dallas County health facilities. 44
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 3-7.
38. Id. at 6.
39. Id. at 8.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 7 (quoting a letter from DCHD to Dr. Balaban).
42. Id. at 8.
43. Id. at 8-9.
44. Letter from Dallas County Health Dept. to David A. Coronado, Reg'l Dir. of the Office of
Civil Rights (July 22, 1981) (on file with author). This letter was introduced into evidence at the
trial.
The letter also expressed the Director's serious concerns about Dr. Balaban's
physical and mental disabilities. 45
In 1982, when our firm filed the suit, Dr. Balaban was no longer
working for the County. His health had deteriorated to the extent that he
was bedridden and blind. (This was before the significant number of drugs
and therapies that can now modify the course of the disease.)46
The Civil Division of the Dallas County District Attorney defended the
case, along with a firm that represented the Director individually. The case
was hotly contested throughout discovery, pre-trial motions, and trial. The
case went to trial in federal court on April 4, 1985. Our team included two
lawyers: myself and a young partner at the firm who was a very talented trial
lawyer.
The judge's rulings on pretrial and trial motions were (in our opinion)
correct. For instance, despite the defendants' Motion in Limine on the
matter, the judge allowed into evidence both of the investigative reports of
the Office of Civil Rights. He also allowed testimony from the
investigators. We were permitted to introduce into evidence copies of the
nurses' log of notes on Dr. Balaban.
Unsurprisingly, the parties differed greatly on the proper form of the
jury charge. The County had submitted proposed jury instructions and
questions that were highly particularized.47 Yet the court opted for a simpler




46. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 7, at 21 ("In recent years, progress in MS
research has accelerated .... The I 990s saw the development of the first therapies that can modify
the course of the disease. Admittedly, these therapies are not a cure, nor do they work equally well
for all patients, but they are a major breakthrough.") According to this 2001 report on the disease
and its future treatments, the treatments developed in recent years include: "the beta-
interferons ... [which are] anti-inflammatory agents that suppress cell migration into the central
nervous system (CNS); and glatiramer acetate (Copaxone), a mixture of peptide fragments thought
to act as a decoy for the immune system to spare myelin from further attack"; and "development of
neuroimaging techniques that allow much more sensitive detection of pathological changes
associated with the MS disease process than was possible in the past." Id. at 20. For a list of current
and emerging treatments as of 2001, see id. at 387-400 app. E.
47. Under the County's proposed approach, the jury would receive a list of eleven actions (such
as the 1979 firing, subjected to different leave requirements, etc.). Defendant's Proposed
Instructions to the Jury and Special Interrogatories, Balaban v. County of Dallas, No. CA3-82-2169-
G (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 1985) (on file with author). As to each, the jury would have to say "yes" or
"no" as to whether: the action occurred (unless the defendants admitted it); Donald Balaban was an
otherwise qualified handicapped person at the time of the particular action; the action constituted
discrimination; and, at the time of the action, the County employed the plaintiff in a program or
activity receiving federal assistance. Id. The same particularized approach would then apply to
assessment of damages. See id.
48. Court's Charge to the Jury, Balaban v. County of Dallas, No. CA3-82-2169-G (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 12, 1985) (on file with author) [hereinafter Court's Charge].
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The first several questions related to our strongest claim: the section 504
claim. Basically, the court's charge included four relatively simple
questions on liability under section 504.
Question Number One: "Was Balaban an 'otherwise qualified
handicapped individual' with regard to the position he was hired for by the
Dallas County Health Department in May, 1977?" 49 The question then
referred to earlier pages in the charge for other instructions, including a
discussion of "otherwise qualified" as meaning a handicapped individual
who, "with reasonable accommodation ... can perform the essential
functions of his job despite his handicap. 50
We were a little worried about how the jury would answer this question
because it required the jurors to envision Dr. Balaban's condition when he
first started to work for the county, rather than the bedridden and blind
condition in which he appeared in his videotaped deposition.
Question Number Two: "Did Salenger subject Balaban to discrimination
solely by reason of Balaban's handicap?",5 1 This was followed by an
instruction stating that Balaban would need to prove that Salenger himself
discriminated, or that he knew of, and approved or acquiesced in, such
discrimination. 52
Question Number Three: "Did the County, through its official policy,
subject Balaban to discrimination solely by reason of Balaban's
handicap?" 5 3 This was followed by an instruction about the basis for finding
an "official policy," which could include actual or constructive knowledge
attributable to "an official to whom [the County had] delegated policy-
making authority.,
54
We were optimistic about the answers to Questions Two and Three. A
"yes" answer to Question Two would be proper if the jury found that even
one action-one of Dr. Salenger's many actions over time-constituted
discrimination solely on the basis of handicap. And, if Question Two
received a "yes" answer, then we were confident about a "yes" answer for
Question Three, given that Dr. Salenger was the Director of the DCHD.55
49. Id. at 15.
50. Id. at 13.
51. Id. at 15.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 16.
54. Id.
55. Question Number Four asked the jury whether the DCHD employed Balaban "in a program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance at the time of any discrimination [it] may have
found." Id. at 18. We felt confident about this issue as well because the judge-correctly, we
After these basic liability questions, 56 the charge contained questions
relating to several affirmative defenses-namely, good faith and statute of
limitations. Then Questions Eleven and Twelve related to compensatory
damages and punitive damages.
We had concerns about the compensatory damages issue, given the
difficulty of finding proof to separate the inevitable physical decline caused
by his illness from the added physical deterioration caused by the
discrimination and resulting stress. And, understandably, it was hard to
predict the range of damages that the jury might find for mental anguish or
stress alone.
Although I cannot find the docket entries to show the length of time the
jury deliberated, my memory is that the jury was back with a verdict in less
than two hours.
On Question One-which we had worried might pose a problem given
how severely impaired Dr. Balaban was during his video deposition-the
jury answered that, "yes," Donald Balaban was a qualified handicapped
person when he was first hired by the County.
But on Questions Two and Three-the basic liability questions-the
answers were both "no." It followed, then, that the remaining questions
either went unanswered or received a "no."
III. WHAT CAN LAW Do?
Needless to say, the verdict was shocking and disappointing. I was
terribly sad for my client, who obtained no public vindication, and who also
lost out on compensation that could have funded additional care which
might have improved the quality of his final years. In addition, the case
broke something in my young lawyer's heart.
At the heart of this deep disappointment was a question about the
purpose of law. This particular anti-discrimination law had been drafted and
implemented for a purpose that seemed incontrovertibly good. But in this
case, in the end, the legal system had produced no benefit to the client.
Indeed, invoking the law and litigating under it might even have worsened
Donald Balaban's situation. If a law such as this one-aimed on its very
believed-had instructed the jury on this in a way that we had easily established. According to the
instructions, a "program or activity" receiving federal assistance could include, among others, a state
or any political subdivision, or any instrumentality of the state or its political subdivisions. See id. at
13.
56. After the four liability questions, the Charge also included two questions relating to a second
statutory claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 21-22. But an affirmative finding on this was
premised on an affirmative finding of liability under section 504, with an additional finding that the
defendants were acting under color of state law. See id.
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face at justice-seemed to make no difference in a case, then what is the
purpose of that law?
Stating this question now is somewhat embarrassing. Obviously,
progress is not measured by a single case. The accomplishments and
limitations of disability-related discrimination laws are topics examined in a
rich, scholarly literature. 57 Thus, to state these questions here seems both
simplistic (given the complexity of the law and its progress) and grandiose,
with a hint of self-pity and self-absorption.
But that question was my real question at the time. It was a spiritual
question relating to law and lawyering. What can a lawyer believe about,
and hope from, law itself?
As noted, this Essay will develop three points: (1) that there are different
answers to this question; (2) that the answers matter not just to theologians
but to lawyers of faith because our answers can shape our expectations about
law practice and how we see our purpose in practicing law; and (3) that,
though the answer is important as a starting point, we will need more to
sustain our lawyering journeys.
This next part of the Essay discusses the first two points together. It
starts by explaining the natural law background that formed my approach to
law practice as a young lawyer. In addition, it shows how this viewpoint
affected my expectations and thoughts about God and human law-how it
formed a kind of "faith within faith." I will contrast this viewpoint and its
effects with another viewpoint, which this Essay terms a "Lutheran" point of
view.
After discussing the natural law, the Lutheran viewpoints, and how they
can matter, the Essay turns to the last point. This last discussion will start by
asking whether either of these approaches is more sustaining or explanatory
over the long run, and it will discuss what else we need as we try to
cooperate in God's justice through our imperfect practice of imperfect
human law.
The accounts of these two viewpoints-the natural law view and the
Lutheran perspective-are necessarily limited. The descriptions here, at
best, capture some central themes of these approaches. But both approaches
are the subject of a vast and sophisticated theological dialogue that is
centuries old and that continues to the present day. This Essay contends that
57. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bageustos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1 (2004);
Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-
Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413 (1991); Laura F. Rothstein,
Reflections on Disability Discrimination Policy-25 Years, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 147
(2000).
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these viewpoints can lead to different working accounts, different "faiths
within the faith," about what law can accomplish. Clearly though, neither
viewpoint necessarily dictates a particular working understanding about
what law can accomplish. Rather, the Essay tries to show that different
working accounts can follow from different theological premises, and that
these working understandings deserve attention and insight.
IV. DIFFERENT ANSWERS, AND WHY THEY MATTER
A. The Natural Law Viewpoint
One does not need to hold a natural law worldview to find the result in
Donald Balaban's case sad and unjust. Almost any lawyer who handled this
case would have had these reactions. But, although I did not realize this at
the time, the way I processed the verdict was through the natural law
viewpoint that had been integral to my faith formation.
As a student in Catholic schools until high school graduation, I grew up
learning the Baltimore Catechism, 58 and studied Thomas Aquinas in high
school. Although at the time I did not perceive my faith formation as being
influenced especially by natural law as distinct from some other model, the
natural law perspective was my strong, guiding light.
Although many readers of this Essay are familiar with that model, and
some have studied it deeply, let me recount its major points.5 9 First, God's
58. The Baltimore Catechism is a textbook of Catholic doctrine approved in 1885 by the Third
Plenary Council of Baltimore. THE THIRD PLENARY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE, A CATECHISM OF
CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE Nos. 1-4 (Tan Books & Publishers 1974) (1885). According to the Note
accompanying No. 3, it was "intended to furnish a complete course of religious instruction" for
Catholic children. Much of the Catechism was in question-and-answer format.
59. The term "natural law" in this paper is limited to the Roman Catholic model. A large body
of legal and philosophical writing in recent years has explored natural law as a theory of rights or
jurisprudence that is not necessarily premised on faith in God. A clear explanation of the links
between natural law and belief in God appears in Robert P. George, Natural Law, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 171, 182 (2008):
The question then arises: can natural law-assuming that there truly are principles of
natural law-provide the basis for a regime of human rights law without consensus on the
existence and nature of God and the role of God in human affairs? In my view, anybody
who acknowledges the human capacities for reason and freedom has good grounds for
affirming human dignity and basic human rights. These grounds remain in place whether
or not one adverts to the question whether there is a divine source of the moral order
whose tenets we discern in inquiry regarding natural law and natural rights. I happen to
think that the answer to this question is yes .... But we do not need agreement on the
answer, so long as we agree about the truths that give rise to the question-namely, that
human beings, possessing the God-like (literally awesome) powers of reason and
freedom, are bearers of a profound dignity that is protected by certain basic rights.
For other contemporary discussions of natural law jurisprudence, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW
AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); MARK C. MURPHY, NATURAL LAW IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
POLITICS (2006). For discussion of the role of natural law originalism in constitutional analysis, see
Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural Law Originalism for the Twenty-First Century-A Principle of Judicial
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law is the Eternal Law. It is perfect and unchanging; it is not subject to time
and place but is eternal. 60  "[T]he whole community of the universe is
governed by Divine Reason .... [S]ince the Divine Reason's conception of
things is not subject to time but is eternal.. . this kind of law must be called
eternal.'
Second, humans have the ability, through the light of natural reason, to
discern and understand, to some degree, the Eternal Law of God. As so
discerned, this is called the natural law. Natural law does not take the place
of the law revealed in Scripture; the latter is what Aquinas terms "Divine
Law," and it also is one way in which Eternal Law is revealed to humans.62
The natural law is the law that humans can discern, through the light of
natural reason, about the Eternal Law.
Wherefore [the rational creature] has a share of the Eternal
Reason, whereby [the rational creature] has a natural inclination to
its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the
rational creature is called the natural law .... [T]he light of natural
reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is
the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us
of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is
nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal
law.63
Restraint, Not Invention, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 383 (2007).
60. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Question 91, First Article, reprinted in ST.
THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW, at 13 (Gateway ed., Eighth Printing 1970).
61. Id. at 12-13.
62. In the Fourth Article of Question 91, Aquinas discusses the Divine law. AQUINAS, supra
note 60, at 22. He explains that there is a need for Divine law in addition to natural law. Natural
law allows humans to participate in the Eternal Law only "proportionately to the capacity of human
nature." Id. Thus, God directly gives Divine law in scripture. "[T]o his supernatural end man needs
to be directed in a yet higher way [than his natural capacity allows]. Hence the additional law
[Divine law] given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law." Id.
63. See id. at 15. As expressed in one major treatise on Catholicism, the Catholic tradition
"insists that human reason, reflecting on human nature and human experience, can also arrive at a
true moral wisdom and knowledge that holds not only for Christians but for all people." RICHARD P.
McBRIEN, CATHOLICISM 959 (1994). Also, consider the following from the encyclical issued by
Pope John XXIII at the start of the Second Vatican Council, Pacem in Terris.
But the world's Creator has stamped man's inmost being with an order revealed to man
by his conscience; and his conscience insists on his preserving it. Men "show the work
of the law written in their hearts. Their conscience bears witness to them." And how
could it be otherwise? All created being reflects the infinite wisdom of God. It reflects it
all the more clearly, the higher it stands in the scale of perfection.
Encyclical from Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris 5-6 (Apr. It, 1963), available at http://www.
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Third, in addition to Eternal Law, Divine Law, and natural law, human
law is necessary. Natural reflects general principles, and more particular
determinations are necessary for the real world. 64 Human law is connected
to natural law (and thus Eternal law): "[Human] laws, insofar as they partake
of right reason, are derived from the [E]ternal law."' 65  This does not mean
that human law is perfect; indeed, a human law might be unjust.
Fourth, one effect of human law can be to make people good. "[T]he
proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given, good. 66 It can do
so by reinforcing, preserving, and fostering virtue that already exists. And
human law, by requiring certain acts, thus creates a habit of those acts.67
Taken together, these points could yield, for the young laywer formed in
this view, an underlying theological narrative along the following lines:
The practice of law is a way to make the world better. Human
laws might be flawed, but by participating in a human legal regime,
I have a chance to make the world better in a way that fits with
God's purposes for a better world. This is because the human laws,
at their best, are applications of the natural law, and the natural law
is derived from Eternal law. By natural reason and effort, by
participating in and improving human law, I help bring the world
more into conformance with natural law and thus with Eternal
law.65
This model was not just something that I had studied and understood
intellectually. It was a "faith within my faith." It shaped my expectations
and understanding about the connection between law, legal practice, God's
plan, and God's justice.
vatican.va/holyfather/john-xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hfj-xxiii encl 1041963_pacemen.html
(last visited Feb. 3, 2009).
64. "[F]rom the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that
the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. These
particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws." AQUINAS, supra note
62, at 18.
65. Id. at 44.
66. Id. at 31.
67. Id. at 32. Aquinas recognizes that a person does not always obey the law because this is the
right thing to do, but only given fear of punishment. But even this can create a habit. Id.
68. A superb discussion of the differences between Roman Catholic and Reformation views
about humankind's nature, as well as the significance of these differences for theories about ethics
and law, can be found in numerous parts of the three volume work by the German theologian Helmut
Thielicke. See 1-3 HELMUT THIELICKE, THEOLOGICAL ETHICS (William H. Lazarath ed., Win. B.
Eerdmans Publ'g Co. 1979) (1966). In Chapter II of Volume 1, Thielicke outlines in detail the
differences between Roman Catholics and Protestants over the original state of nature of humans,
and what this implies for theories of ethics. See l id. at 195-221. The Chapter is titled: "The
Evangelical-Roman Catholic Debate on Creation and the Original State." Id.
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Law can move the world along the trajectory towards justice. Civil
rights laws, including the disability discrimination law, can create this
movement in several ways. These laws prevent some acts of wrongdoing
simply given the power of the prohibition alone.69 And, when wrong occurs
anyway, the law helps correct-via injunctions or via money damages for
harm caused.70 So, even if this antidiscrimination law never alters the hearts
or minds of anyone with respect to disability, it will prevent some
wrongdoings (by threat of sanction), and it will alleviate the effect of wrongs
that do happen.
The effect of a good law goes beyond its corrective and restraining
power. Within the natural law viewpoint, each newly discerned principle of
God's order is a piece of new knowledge that, in turn, we can all see more
clearly because it is now articulated. Sometimes it is articulated in books or
in church doctrines. But sometimes it is articulated in human law. And,
when an anti-discrimination principle is both discerned and articulated in
law, its power to affect the world's trajectory is not just via the force of
sanction. Rather, an articulation of a law that shares in the Eternal law has
some power to move our hearts, to help us move towards it. Such a
principle is like a candle: once it is articulated, as for instance in law, then
the candle is lit and people are drawn toward it-not perfectly, not
inevitably, yet to some extent.
Even granting this viewpoint, however, isn't it an overreaction to be
knocked completely off stride by one episode of injustice? Certainly, no
single case can invalidate the natural law model; the adverse verdict we
received did not theoretically or theologically undermine the natural law
model.
But the natural law model does not just sit on the shelf as theology or
theory. Like any theology that truly becomes part of our faith education, the
natural law model can shape the lens through which we see and interpret our
world.
This is why a lawyer formed within a natural law framework could
experience the Balaban verdict not just as a sad and unjust result, but also as
a tremor within her theological world view. True, the natural law viewpoint
is no guarantee against injustice or even systemic injustice. 7' But it does
69. See supra note 2.
70. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
71. A point that needs to be clarified here is the relation between natural law and the problem of
theodicy. As described in the text, a person formed within a natural law viewpoint might be more
optimistic about the trajectory of justice in this world. This might suggest that the natural law model
has a particular approach to the problem of evil-for instance, that natural law theology would
posit a real connection between human law and Eternal law, and it does posit
that the articulation of this law can move people's hearts and minds towards
the good. Thus, natural law is a theology of expectation about the effects of
human law. For the young lawyer formed in this viewpoint, the clash
between the legal system in practice and the natural law viewpoint was real.
So perhaps the clash signals that the natural law viewpoint is misguided.
Indeed, maybe this faith within my faith is misguiding. It tempts me to
focus on changing the world or getting the result I think is the right one-
winning this case or this disability benefit. It tempts me towards anger when
what I view as justice does not prevail. And it leads me to false optimism
about my own ability to discern what the just or right result is.72
Without yet deciding whether the natural law viewpoint is misguided
and misguiding, it seems appropriate to ask whether there is another answer
to the question of what we can believe about, and hope from, law.
B. The "Lutheran" Viewpoint
Although I did not realize it then, natural law is not the only viewpoint
through which to see this question. Many Christians have quite different
views about the relationship between God's divine order and what
humankind can discern and accomplish in this world. Let me very briefly
outline one of these, what I will call a "Lutheran" point of view, even though
it is not specific to Luther and does not capture Luther's thought in all its
nuance. 
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expect an inevitable "closing of the gap" between human law and Eternal law, and thus expect less
evil over time. But this is not the position of natural law theology. The question oftheodicy looms
over all theologies, and natural law theory does not rule out one approach over others. However, a
natural law perspective (and any other theological perspective) probably does affect how a person
views various "answers" to the problem of theodicy. Theodicy challenges all theologies, asking
about the presence of injustice, evil, and suffering in God's world. But questions are shaped in part
by constructs within the questions. For instance, a follower of the Manichean school, one of the
Christian heresies that Augustine found attractive in his early years, might be asked why evil exists
in a world created by God. For the Manichean, the answer would be that evil is the creation of a
different creator, who created all the evil and bad matter in the world, while God created only the
good. For many Judeo-Christian thinkers, the question of evil has been asked against a backdrop in
which God has three qualities: all-knowing, all-loving, and all-powerful. At times, thinkers address
the problem of evil by modifying the premise of omnipotence. According to theologian Dorotee
Soelle, writers and theologians as diverse as Elie Wiesel, Abraham Heschel, Rabbi Harold Kushner,
and Dietrich Bonhoeffer "conceive[] of God as love, but not as omnipotent." DOROTHEE SOELLE,
THEOLOGY FOR SKEPTICS: REFLECTIONS ON GOD 65 (Augsburg Fortress Publishers 1995) (1992).
72. Cf I THIELICKE, supra note 68 at 252-53. Here, he refers to some of the implications of the
critique he has elaborated in the previous two chapters, relating to Roman Catholic theology about
the nature of humans. Under the Protestant view, as distinct from Roman Catholic theology, "there
is no positive natural 'disposition,' and ...the supposed 'positive' endowments (under Roman
Catholic theology] give rise to pharisaic presumption and self-confidence which are a hindrance to
grace...." Id. at 253.
73. Some of what follows draws on the Book of Concord. The Book of Concord is the
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The Lutheran view is skeptical that humans, by the light of divine
reason imprinted by God, can discover or understand God's Eternal Law by
discerning the imprint of that law in this world.7 4 As the Christian ethicist
compilation of the various statements of creed that have guided the Lutheran Church since the
publication of the Book of Concord in 1580. See CONCORDIA: THE LUTHERAN CONFESSIONS (Paul
T. McCain, 2d. ed. 2005). Each book or portion of the Book of Concord has its own history.
Among the books included in it are two Catechisms authored by Martin Luther, the Small Catechism
and the Large Catechism, both written in 1529. See id. at xxxi (giving an overview of documents in
the Book of Concord). Also included is the Augsburg Confession, completed in 1530, which is
"[o]ften viewed as the chief Lutheran Confession." Id. The first presentation of the Augsburg
Confession was nine years after Martin Luther had been excommunicated and sentenced to death as
a heretic. Yet within a few years, the Reformation had spread to such an extent that eventually the
Emperor Charles V ordered an Imperial meeting to resolve the disagreements throughout the
Empire. See Editor's Introduction to the Augsburg Confession, in CONCORDIA, supra, at 21-22.
The Augsburg Confession was presented to the Emperor on June 25, 1530 as the expression of faith
followed by Lutherans, and it has "never been withdrawn." Id. at 25. The Emperor disputed the
Augsburg Confession by producing a "Confutation" of the Confession and demanding that the
Lutherans concede. Yet the Lutherans replied with a document primarily drafted by Philip
Melanchton, known as the Apology of the Augsburg Confession. The Apology contains a detailed
response to the Roman Catholic disagreements with the Augsburg Confession. See Editor's
Introduction to the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, in CONCORDIA, supra, at 69-70.
Still another major document in the Book of Concord is the Formula of Concord. This had several
authors, and was completed in 1577. By this time, Lutherans had become divided over some of the
teachings in the Augsburg Confessions. The purpose of the Formula of Concord was to restate some
of the key teachings that had become the subject of disagreement. See id. at xxxii. The unabridged
version of the Formula of Concord is known as the Solid Declaration, and the abridged version is
known as the Epitome. See id.
74. For a detailed critique, from a Protestant perspective, of the Roman Catholic view of natural
law, see I THIELICKE, supra note 68, at 420-33. This is not to say that Luther, Calvin, or other
Protestant Reformers and theologians have rejected the existence of natural law. Rather, much of
the disagreement relates to how "fallen" humankind is, an issue that in turn affects how one sees
human reason as participating in or bearing the imprint of Divine Reason. Reinhold Niebuhr's
classic, The Nature and Destiny of Man, concludes that a doctrine of "total depravity" is not really
representative of most Protestant thought. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF
MAN, VOLUME I: HUMAN NATURE (1941). He notes that Protestant thought has sometimes made
"extravagant statements of man's depravity," and then has "confused the effort to moderate such
statements by the admission that some little power of justice remained to man." Id. at 268. See also
McBRIEN, supra note 63, at 181 (noting that "historical studies have shown that the positions of
Luther, Calvin, and Melanchthon were more nuanced than first appeared"). A good explanation of
how John Calvin's thinking (which recognizes natural law) departs from the Catholic view on
natural law appears in C. Scott Pryor, God's Bridle: John Calvin's Application of Natural Law, 22
J.L. & RELIGION 225, 235 (2007):
First, Thomas [Aquinas] stated that the relationship between the human and the divine
was one of participation. Nothing in Calvin's writings suggested that he shared
Thomas's belief in a metaphysical continuity or chain of being from God through man to
all of creation. Second, Thomas specified human participation in the divine in terms of
the faculty of reason. Participation in reason provided the epistemic counterpart to
metaphysical participation in being and Calvin made no more use of the former than the
latter.
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Paul Ramsey has explained, Catholic theologians recognize the grave effects
of sin, but "deny that sin seriously affects man's grasp and exercise of the
first principles of natural reason. ' 75  By contrast, "Luther and Calvin
opposed this limitation of the injurious effect of sin upon man's nature. 76
Rather, the Reformers' view was that "sinfulness spiritually pervades the
whole self with all its human capacities fully intact yet all alike under the
sway of sin."77
Within the Lutheran viewpoint, a vast theological history is associated
with the uses of law. The phrase "Law and Gospel" often denotes this
complex history and theology. "Law" within this theological debate refers
not so much to positive law, but to the moral law or the Ten
Commandments.78 Thus, the notion of law within this extensive literature is
not primarily about the meaning, purposes, or ends of civil or criminal
positive law in this world. Yet, in focusing on the purposes and limits of the
moral law or the Ten Commandments, the Lutheran viewpoint has
implications for the purposes and limits of positive civil or criminal law.
Under the Lutheran view, the law clearly has two uses-what Lutheran
theology calls the first use of the law and the second use of the law. The
first use of the law is to restrain evil. "[E]xtemal discipline and decency are
maintained by it .... 79
The second use of the law is as a spiritual reminder to humans of how
they fall short of God's will and how they need God's grace. This second
use of law, then, is to be a spiritual taskmaster-to expose and remind us of
our shortcomings and our utter dependence on external grace for any
movement towards goodness. 80
75. PAUL RAMSEY, BASIC CHRISTIAN ETHICS 282 (1953).
76. Id. Cf John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion:
While experience testifies that the seeds of religion are sown by God in every heart, we
scarcely find one man in a hundred who cherishes what he has received, and not one in
whom they grow to maturity ....
That seed, which it is impossible to eradicate, a sense of the existence of a Deity, yet
remains; but so corrupted as to produce only the worst of fruits.
JOHN CALVIN, A COMPEND OF CALVIN'S INSTITUTES 8-9 (Hugh Thomson Kerr, Jr. ed., 1939).
77. RAMSEY, supra note 75, at 283.
78. "[I]n this discussion, by Law we mean the Ten Commandments, wherever they are read in
the Scriptures." Apology of the Augsburg Confession, Art. IV, in CONCORDIA, supra note 73, at 73,
83.
79. The Formula of Concord, Art. VI, in CONCORDIA, supra note 73, at 503, 557-58. As
explained in one recent discussion of the three uses of law, "[iln Lutheran theology... [t]hefirst use
of the Law is the threat to punish sin with temporal and eternal penalties. The first use is for
unbelievers for whom threats of punishment can coerce only into outward obedience." SCOTT R.
MURRAY, LAW, LIFE, AND THE LIVING GOD: THE THIRD USE OF THE LAW IN MODERN AMERICAN
LUTHERANISM 13 (2002) (emphasis in original).
80. "The second use of the Law is the distinctively theological use of the Law that lays bare
human wickedness and makes clear the need for a Savior." MURRAY, supra note 79, at 13-14.
According to the Formula of Concord, the second use is that, "through the preaching of the
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In the earliest formulations of the various documents that formed the
Book of Concord, a possible third use of the law also appeared. The validity
of this third use has remained a subject of debate from these early
formulations to the present. The third use is a teaching function of the law,
in which law can direct the believer and help him or her live in obedience
and gladness. So the law is not just a "stick" to beat us (the second use) but
also a "cane" that the believer can use to help walk the Christian life. 8'
Thus, the Lutheran perspective is considerably more skeptical than the
Catholic natural law perspective about the effects of moral or justice-based
mandates. As summarized in Helmut Thielicke's major work on
Theological Ethics:
Reformation theology takes a different path [than the Catholic
approach]. Perceiving the total permeation of creation by sin, it
recognizes neither an intact component of existence nor ... an ideal
order of nature and creation in which this component of existence
might be objectified and over whose "foundation," "interpretation,"
and "application" the church should exercise "watchfulness."
Reform theology thus finds in the Law of God for the fallen world,
not directives for a positive order, but primarily a negative protest
against disorder. 82
The Lutheran view, then, reflects grave doubt about any connection
between natural law and human law, and also doubts that ethical commands
(e.g., the Ten Commandments) can influence behavior. 83 From this view,
one could derive the following narrative about the possible function of law
in this world: We are quite incorrect to think that discerning or improving
Law... the hearts of impenitent people may be terrified, and ... they may be brought to a
knowledge of their sins and to repentance." The Formula of Concord, Art. VI, in CONCORDIA, supra
note 73, at 503, 557.
81. See RAMSEY, supra note 75, at 282-83. According to the Formula of Concord, this third use
is as follows: "[W]hen people have been born anew by God's Spirit, converted to the Lord, and
Moses's veil has been lifted from them, they live and walk in the Law ...." See Formula of
Concord, in CONCORDIA, supra note 73, at 558. But the Formula of Concord also noted the dispute
over this third use. "A disagreement has arisen between a few theologians about this third and final
use of the Law." Id. These theologians argue "the regenerate do not learn the new obedience (in
what good works they ought to walk) from the Law." Id. Rather, only the "prompting and impulse
of the Holy Spirit" causes good works, "just as the sun by itself (without any [foreign] impulse)
completes its ordinary course in the sky." Id.
82. See 2 THIELICKE, supra note 68, at 548-49. The phrases in quotes are taken from an address
by Pope Pius XII in 1954. See id. at 548.
83. See id.
human law can help society or humankind to move closer to God, God's
will, or God's justice. The way to improve society, to bring God's kingdom
here to earth, is through individual conversion and life in the churches and
family. We are sorely mistaken if we hope that human law, or its
improvement, will help bring God's justice. Indeed, we can be more than
mistaken, we can be misled. 4
What if this approach had been my faith framework-my "faith within
the faith"--during the Balaban trial? Would this have mattered, and if so,
how?
I can address this question only with a thought experiment, because I
was not formed in this viewpoint and also might not understand it
completely. But it seems that the experience of law's failings would have
clashed less with a Lutheran view than a natural law view. Formed in a
Lutheran view, I would have been more skeptical about what the law could
accomplish. I would have been less certain about the power of my own
reason to discern the "right" result. I would have been more attentive to
law's function as simply restraining us from doing the wrong thing, and thus
would have more readily seen that the Balaban litigation might have
restrained the County from similar behavior in the future.
Thus far, this Essay has developed two points. One is that there are
different theological answers to the question of what we can believe about,
and hope from, law.8 5 A second is that these answers can matter in shaping
how a lawyer of faith sees the role and possible effects of human law.8 6
Granted, these points have been developed in connection with one case
result, at one point of time in a young lawyer's life. But the aim thus far has
not been to trace fully how these theological viewpoints could play out over
84. If this narrative were taken to an extreme, then it would lead to withdrawal from the effort to
engage the world in social reform efforts. Thus, the narrative in text is not meant to imply the
extreme consequence of the narrative. In a famous text, Carl F. H. Henry critiqued the strain of
fundamentalism and evangelicalism that had led to systematic non-engagement with the world. He
did not disagree that these movements were correct in their starting doubts about the nature of man.
"Of all modem viewpoints, when measured against the black background of human nature disclosed
by the generation of two world wars, Fundamentalism provided the most realistic appraisal of the
condition of man." CARL F. H. HENRY, THE UNEASY CONSCIENCE OF MODERN FUNDAMENTALISM
7 (2003). Yet these thinkers remained preoccupied with individual sin rather than "social evil." Id.
Thus,
the evangelical is convinced that the non-evangelical [social reformers] operate within
the wrong ideological framework to make achievement a possibility .... He believes the
liberal, the humanist, and the ethical idealist share a shallow sense of the depth of world
need and an over-optimism concerning man's own supposed resources for far-reaching
reversal even of admitted wrongs.
Id. at 15.
85. See supra Part IV.
86. See supra Part IV.
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time. The next section of the Essay will include a longer view of how these
viewpoints can matter over time.
V. THE LONGER JOURNEY: IS EITHER VIEWPOINT BETTER?
Because we see that different models can shape our experiences and
expectations about law, we understandably might ask whether one is better.
I have asked this question over time as both my legal experience and my
theological knowledge have grown, however imperfectly.
In asking which one is better, we could be referring to a theological
assessment about natural law, the Reformation view, or nuanced versions of
each of these. Systematic theology literature contains extensive work in this
area. But the question we are asking is more pastoral- and lawyering-related
than systematic: for a lawyer of faith, is there any "faith within faith" about
law that is more explanatory and sustaining as to the ends or purposes of law
and lawyering?
Although I have thought about this question for some years, I now think
it might be the wrong question. The question has two failings. But, by
seeing these failings, we can also construct a better set of questions and
insights into a lawyer's "faith within faith" about the role and purposes of
law.
One failing is that, even if we could answer the question, the answer
might not have much effect, at least for many of us. We all carry with us
various "faiths within the faith" of our Christian faith. These are not the
creedal or foundational doctrinal points of our faith, but they are part of the
deep identity through which we experience the world and God's movement
in the world and in our lives. The manner and "rooted-ness" of our faith
formation shape these "faiths within faith" and their durability.
For many of us, and certainly for me, the framework of natural law or
other theories is a deep thread in my faith fabric. So even if I concluded,
intellectually and theologically, that a Lutheran viewpoint is more
persuasive, it would be hard to unwind or extract that thread. 87 This is not
an argument that certain theologies, once understood, can never be
dislodged. Rather, the point is just that some "faiths within faith" for an
87. To illustrate, when I read Helmet Thielicke's rich analysis of the natural law model and
Reformation theology, and when I re-imagine handling the Balaban case while having a
Reformation framework, the Reformation approach seems more theologically persuasive, and a
better interpretive framework for the Balaban case. See I THIELICKE, supra note 68. But none of
this really changes my deeper "faith within faith."
individual merge with long-lived experience and are not altered by a
theological or intellectual assessment.
The natural law viewpoint is my home; its sights and smells and fixtures
are familiar to me, and they order and make sense of how I see the world.
The Reformation narrative, by contrast, seems severe and lonely. It seems to
paint a world that is more removed from who God is and what His justice
might be. It is perhaps not a more pessimistic view, ultimately (given the
role of grace), but it is more pessimistic about the natural world itself.
A second problem with the question is that, as the lawyer over time tries
to connect the lawyering journey with God's justice, the lawyer will still
have to find answers or sources of support in addition to what either model
provides. The lawyer needs more "bread for the journey" than either
model-however rich-gives on its own. So the better question after
Balaban was not: "What is the right theology about what human law can
do?" The question for any of us, under any larger theology about what law
can do in this world, is: "How do I keep growing in the ability to cooperate
with God's justice?"
This question calls for a process, 88 not an answer. Many of you here,
and lawyers of faith everywhere, could give us insight into that process.
Here are some of the insights that have been important and helpful to me.
First, no theology about the role and purposes of human law can give us
enough guidance about the task, for each of us, of cooperating in God'sjustice. Indeed, if we try to find that guidance solely within the theological
model, we might find ourselves not just lacking bread, but misguided and
mistaken. The Balaban case is an example. My theology was not the
problem; the problem was relying on this theology as an algorithm of how
human law would work. Even after the verdict, my reaction was driven by
this algorithm tendency, which in turn led either to despair ("so, it just
doesn't matter what you do in law") or to constantly revisiting the question
of what was wrong with the algorithm.
Second, we should be aware that any theology about the role of law can
be misguiding--either given its doctrine or, more likely (as in my case), how
we have come to interpret it. Under my approach to law, I underestimated
grace-its unpredictability, its lack of connection to visible "legal"
improvements, and its mystery. 9 During the Balaban case, I focused on the
88. Much of the necessary process includes the good practices of any spiritual walk. The text
tries to focus on the part of the process that might be especially related to lawyering.
89. This is a persoral observation more than a theological point. The natural law narrative that
was at the base of my formation surely included an important role for grace. But, in the narrative as
I understood it, grace was more contiguous with nature. In giving this very brief description of my
own understanding, I do not intend to minimize the great complexity of the debates among both
Catholic and Protestant theologians about the relationship of natural law, human nature, and grace.
For extensive discussion of the Catholic versus Reformers' view, see I THIELICKE, supra note 68, at
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rightness of our cause, the wrongness of the County's cause, and what I
expected would be the beneficial results of the certain legal victory. But if
you were to ask if there were moments of grace in the case-if Dr. Balaban
ever experienced some relief from suffering, a sense of hope, a sense of
camaraderie, or some other a moment of grace-I do not know. I never felt
one. I felt only certainty and righteousness, and then bitter disappointment.
Maybe my eyes weren't trained to see these moments. I was expecting to
see one step forward in the working of God's justice. When I did not see
that, I saw nothing but lots of work that had all been for naught, and maybe
all for the worse.
A wonderful example of certainty and rigidity about the relation of law
and God appears in Victor Hugo's great novel, Les Mis~rables.90 The
example is the famous character of Inspector Javert. Javert pursues the
escaped thief, Jean Valjean, throughout the entire book. He continues to
pursue VaIjean even though, at one point, Valjean saves Javert's life. In the
last part of the book, Javert finally captures Valjean, and then grants
Valjean's request that the carriage take him by for one last stop to Valjean's
home. 91 As Jean Valjean goes inside the house, Javert leaves, basically
letting Valjean go free and giving up the quest for Valjean that has
consumed so many years. 9'
In an entire chapter of the book titled "Javert Off the Track," we see
Javert in an inner struggle between the code that has defined his life-
capturing the wrongdoer-and the act of mercy he has just performed:
His supreme anguish was the loss of all certainty. He felt that
he was uprooted. The code was now but a stump in his
hand.... There was within him a revelation of feeling entirely
distinct from the declarations of the law, his only standard
hitherto.... An entire new world appeared to his soul; ... the
possibility of a tear in the eye of the law, a mysterious justice,
according to God, going counter to justice according to men. 93
222-49. As the Catholic theologian Richard P. McBrien has stated, "The problem of the relationship
between nature and grace is as fundamental a problem as we will ever come upon in all of Christian
theology." MCBRIEN, supra note 63, at 181.
90. VICTOR HUGO, LES MIStRABLES (Henry Coates n.d.) (1884).
91. Id. at 176.
92. Id. at 180.
93. Id. at 193.
Third, we need to develop a working personal faith answer about the
problem of evil and suffering. The lawyer is not uniquely challenged by evil
and suffering; these are humankind's inherited and most challenging
theological problems. But a lawyering life, like that of a minister or doctor
or social worker, will take us to the side of clients in need. And this will
often require us to be a witness to and a translator of suffering, and then to
witness and translate what will often be law's limitations in addressing that
suffering.94
Fourth, whatever our theology is about the connection of human law and
God's law, we need to have a theology of hope. The natural law viewpoint
might be more hopeful about human nature than the Lutheran view,95 but we
have seen how it can yield to despair when expectations do not match up.
Again, the need for hope is not unique to lawyers, but in the life of
lawyering we will need a rich and intentional theology of hope. We work
within private and public law regimes that often yield partial justice, and in
which we often must try to win our clients' side of the dispute or transaction.
Thus, we must guard against the presumption that we are right-that we can
find and have delivered justice-and we must guard against despair. As the
theologian Jurgen Moltmann has explained, both presumption and despair
are inconsistent with hope.96  "Hope alone is to be called 'realistic,"' he
says, because:
it alone takes seriously the possibilities with which all reality is
fraught. It does not take things as they happen to stand or to lie,
but as progressing, moving things with possibilities of
change.... [H]opes and anticipations of the future are not a
transfiguring glow superimposed upon a darkened existence, but are
realistic ways of perceiving the scope of our real possibilities. 97
VI. CONCLUSION
After the Balaban case, I alternated between two theological responses.
At times, I kept trying to "solve" the link between God's justice and human
94. One semester, when I was teaching a writing seminar on Faith, Morality, and Law, a student
came to meet with me, as required, to discuss the topic she had chosen for her final paper. Because
she had already accepted a job, post-graduation, with the district attorney's child abuse prosecution
section, she told me that she wanted to write a paper about evil and suffering. She made it clear that
her goal was not to write about it as systematic theology, but to equip herself to go forward in
practice.
95. See RAMSEY, supra note 75, at 282-83; see also AQUINAS, supra note 60, at 14-16.
96. JURGEN MOLTMANN, THEOLOGY OF HOPE: ON THE GROUND AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF A
CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY 25 (James W. Leitch, trans., First Fortress Press ed. 1993).
97. Id.
[Vol. 36: 547, 2009] What Can We Hope For from Law?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
law. At other times, I gave into some measure of despair about what civil
rights laws could ever accomplish-a "why bother" response.
Both of these responses were incorrect. I did not have the "wrong"
theology about the relation of God's justice and human law. But I did lack
attentiveness to the presence of grace, and I also lacked a theology of hope.
Now, many years later, I can graft onto the case some claims of grace and
hope. For instance, it seems plausible that the litigation invigorated Donald
Balaban intellectually and psychologically, and that he valued our support
and camaraderie. Possibly, the case caused changes in the County. But if
any of this happened, I missed it because I was more intent on marching
towards my own view of justice than on finding or helping participate in any
moments of grace; I was driven by certainty, rather than by hope.
In the twenty-plus years since the Balaban verdict, I've been able to
work on many cases that, like the black lung case in the D.C. Circuit, seek a
benefit or right that matters greatly to an individual client even if the amount
is not large by some standards. These include social security disability
benefit claims; federal postal worker accommodation requests and federal
postal workers' compensation; individualized education plans (IEP) in
public schools; and coverage under Medicaid.
And a natural law viewpoint is still the starting point in how I see the
relation between God's justice and human law. These human laws aim,
however imperfectly, to carry out principles originating in Eternal Law,
discemable by the light of natural reason: the dignity and worth of every
person whatever his or her level of physical or mental ability; the obligation
of the community to guarantee a basic standard of living to those whose
disabilities prevent them from achieving this; the right to be free from
violence and to protect one's children; and the right to education. 98 And
these laws, despite their limits, move us and our society closer to God's
justice. Our lawyering lives are not just holding patterns, a tending of the
fences.
Yet, I no longer expect to see, in a given case or a stream of cases, proof
that the human law has vindicated a natural law principle such as dignity,
fairness, or freedom from violence. A belief in the connection between
human law, natural law, and the Eternal Law cannot turn on a win-loss
record. Indeed, focusing attention only on this connection is a recipe for
either presumption or despair. We should believe that lawyering will bring
unpredictable moments of grace. We should know that lawyering gives us a
98. This is not to say that concern about these issues can derive only from a natural law
viewpoint; rather, this is my framework.
ministry of presence, an opportunity to sit next to someone who has fallen
into the dark well of suffering even if the ropes of law are not long or strong
enough to get them out. 99 And we should have an intentional hope that
rejects both certainty and despair about what law can do in this world.
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99. See DOROTHEE SOELLE, THEOLOGY FOR SKEPTICS: REFLECTIONS ON GOD 65 (Augsburg
Fortress 1995) (1992) (discussing the imagery of sitting in the well in theological discussions).
